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I. INTRODUCTION
If the "person on the street" were asked to name a right guar-
anteed to all Americans by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, freedom of speech would likely come quickly to mind,
along with the concomitant right of free press. The rights to practice
one's religion and peaceably assemble, even the judicially created
right of free association might follow closely behind. Few people, how-
ever, would mention the "right of the people.., to petition the govern-
ment for redress of grievances."' Fewer still would be able to give a
good definition of petitioning, or to describe the types of activities
protected by the right.2 One obvious reason for the general lack of
awareness of the existence and contours of the petition right is the
almost total absence of judicial scrutiny directed at the Petition
Clause in the years since the Framers included it in the First
Amendment as a separate textual guarantee. This judicial "silent
treatment" stands in stark contrast to the eager and exacting scrutiny
applied to the other First Amendment guarantees such as free speech,
press, and religion. The substance and scope of these rights have
been alternately reduced and expanded over time as the rights
themselves are continuously redefined by the courts to fit the
sensibilities of each generation. The petition right, deprived of the
nuance and repetition-engendered familiarity provided by this sort of
natural, ongoing evolution, arrives into the late twentieth century
somewhat awkwardly, a little-understood visitor from another age.
Claims of impingement of the petition right have been raised
in recent years by public employees whose government employers
have allegedly retaliated against them for engaging in petitioning
activity. Courts, leery of venturing into an area where legal precedent
is virtually non-existent, either ignore the claims or use a pre-existing
analytical framework developed in response to claims of impingement
1. U.S. Const., Amend. I.
2. Black's Law Dictionary defines a "petition" as "a formal written request addressed to
some governmental authority." Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (6th ed. 1990). Examples of
petitioning activity include presenting a laundry list of policy criticisms to a legislative body,
submitting a request to an administrative board for action on some matter laid before it, or
filing an application with a court requesting judicial action on a certain matter. Id.
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of other first amendment rights such as speech or association. This
subordination of the petition right to other, more fully developed first
amendment rights is a long-standing trend in American
jurisprudence, despite the fact that the petition right clearly predates
the other first amendment rights and has even been described as the
likely source of these rights.3 In San Filippo v. Bongiovanni,4 a case
involving the claim of a professor at a state university who was
allegedly fired for exercising his petition rights, the Third Circuit
recently endeavored to break away from this practice of treating the
Petition Clause as an inferior stepchild in the first amendment family
of rights.
Why the petition right, which has been described as "the cor-
nerstone of the Anglo-American constitutional system,"5 has failed to
achieve the fame and stature of its first amendment counterparts is a
question beyond the scope of this Recent Development.6 However, the
virtually complete lack of acknowledgment of the petition right by
American courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, is an
important theme underlying the chronicling of petition clause
jurisprudence presented in this Recent Development. Any critique of
a petition clause analysis must be grounded in an understanding of
the daunting task faced by a court, such as the Third Circuit in San
Filippo, that expresses the rare willingness to consider a petition
clause claim. Such courts must piece together an analysis from the
dicta of the few supreme court cases dealing explicitly with the
Petition Clause, usually in a context completely unrelated to the case
at hand.7 In addition, due to the lack of instructive precedent in post-
constitutional case law, courts and legal scholars alike have been
forced to place an unusually heavy reliance on pre-constitutional
3. Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging.. ." An Analysis of the Neglected,
But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1153, 1153 (1986).
4. 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 735 (January 9, 1995).
5. Smith, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1153 (cited in note 3).
6. For one theory, see Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition
Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 Yale L. J. 142 (1986). Professor Higginson
explains that the practice of petitioning floundered when abolitionists flooded Congress with
petitions during the debates over slavery. As a result of Congress's unwillingness to
acknowledge these petitions, Higginson contends, the right of petition was collapsed into the
right of free speech and expression, a definitional narrowing which continues to this day. Id. at
142-144.
7. For instance, courts considering right of access to courts claims in the context of retali-
atory discharge actions have relied heavily on McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985), a case




history in attempting to determine the scope of the modern petition
right. For these reasons, an exploration of the origins and history of
the petition right is a necessary antecedent to a discussion of the
Third Circuit's holding in San Filippo.
Accordingly, Part II.A of this Recent Development provides a
brief summary of the pre-constitutional development of the petition
right in England and America. s Part II.B chronicles the treatment
afforded the petition right, in various contexts, by modern American
courts. Part I1.C provides a more specific legal background for the
analysis of San Filippo, describing the retaliatory discharge cause of
action, which is the subject of the discussion in San Filippo, as it has
developed in the context of claims of impingement of the first
amendment right of free speech. Part III lays out the analytical
framework articulated in San Filippo, while Part IV evaluates the
court's holding and offers some suggestions for determining the scope
of the modern petition right, based on the division of the right into the
two categories of political and judicial petitions.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Constitutional Origins of the Petition Right
There is no doubt that the recognition of the petition right in
Anglo-American jurisprudence substantially predates the recognition
of the other enumerated first amendment rights. The Magna Carta,
signed in 1215, granted to British nobility the right to bring their
collective requests and complaints before the crown. 9 In exchange for
the grant of a royal audience and the opportunity to obtain redress for
their grievances, the barons refrained from engaging in armed revolt
against the crown. 10 Throughout the centuries, the petition right in
England evolved with the changing political climate, expanding to
include broader segments of the population, and adapting to the in-
creasing complexity of government and the shift of power from the
8. This is a vast and fascinating topic which can merely be touched upon in this Recent
Development. For detailed and lengthy accounts of the origins and history of the petition right,
see generally, Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a
Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. 15 (1993); Smith,
54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1153 (cited in note 3); Higginson, 96 Yale L. J. 142 (cited in note 6).




monarch to Parliament." Representative 12 petitioning before
Parliament continued as it had before the crown, but more and more
petitions were brought by individuals. Some of these individual peti-
tions criticized or demanded change in certain governmental policies
or practices, but some were requests for individual relief based on
purely private grievances.13 Petitions falling into the latter category
were referred to special Parliamentary Committees for resolution
through quasi-judicial proceedings. 14  Eventually, these 'Judicial
petitions" were addressed directly to the emerging royal court
system. 5 Despite the increasing specialization of government and the
increasing diversity of the claims presented, all written submissions
to the sovereign continued to fall under the protective umbrella of the
general right to petition the government for redress of grievances.16
This same system of petitioning was transferred more or less
intact to America where, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
colonists were allowed to bring their written complaints to the local
courts, legislative bodies, councils, or governors. In the wilds of
colonial America, the same governing body by necessity often
performed executive, judicial, and legislative functions. 7 This overlap
of governmental functions contributed to the continuation in America
of the broad definition of petitioning that had developed in England.18
The petition right in colonial America encompassed complaints
brought by groups as well as by individuals, on subject matters
ranging from the highly charged political issues of the day to
mundane and purely private grievances. 9
11. Id. at 23.
12. "Representative" petitions were requests or criticisms presented by a single petitioner
on behalf of groups of subjects and eventually on behalf of political constituencies. Id. For
examples of this kind of "collective" petitioning in the modern world, see notes 32-40 and accom-
panying text.
13. Note the initial development of the two categories of political and judicial petition
described more fully in Part IV of this Recent Development. The political petition right was a
purely expressive right, carrying only the guarantee of being heard. The judicial petition right,
however, began to carry with it the expectation of some type of governmental response, usually
in the form of an adjudication on the issue contained in the petition. See notes 216-232 and
accompanying text.
14. Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 24 (cited in note 8).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 28; Higginson, 96 Yale L. J. at 145-47 (cited in note 6).
18. Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 28 (cited in note 8).
19. Higginson, 96 Yale L. J. at 146 (cited in note 6). A representative complaint from the
Connecticut General Assembly alleged that one "George Nichols had in an undue
manner ... obtained and gotten from petitioner a deed of his house and lands." Id.
1995] 1701
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The petition right of early colonial times, though broader than
it had been in its medieval origins, was arguably more vulnerable.
After all, by the seventeenth century, the average petitioner no longer
represented a group of well-armed and land-hungry barons. 20 He was
much more vulnerable to retaliation than his medieval predecessors.
And the British government did from time to time punish its subjects,
in England and America, for bringing petitions that were
controversial or openly critical of the government. 21 But petitioning
had become entrenched in tradition and was extremely popular
among the citizenry. Parliament's increased sensitivity to the ever-
expanding electorate rendered punitive responses to petitions less and
less frequent, ensuring the continuance of petitioning as a politically
meaningful right.22
By the mid-eighteenth century virtually no restrictions
remained on the petition right.23 This tolerant attitude extended to
the colonies, where, on the eve of the American Revolution, political
petitions were taking on increasingly hostile tones.24 This largely
unrestricted petition right was preserved by the founding fathers
throughout the duration and aftermath of the Revolutionary War.25
In fact, in light of the harsh seditious libel restrictions imposed on
speech by nervous patriots in an effort to diminish the persuasive
power of those opposed to the revolution, the political petition
represented the only authorized way for early Americans to present
complaints and criticisms to the government. 26 Some scholars point to
20. One commentator has pointed out that the only method of enforcing the petition right
granted in the Magna Carta was through "the baronial seizure of royal land and possessions
each time [King] John refused or delayed redress." Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 22
(cited in note 8). Obviously this option was not available to the individual petitioner in colonial
America.
21. See id. at 26-27, 30 (describing the punishments the British government visited upon
petitioners).
22. Id. at 26-27. See also the 1689 Bill of Rights exacted of William and Mary, stating that
"it is the Right of the Subjects to petition the King," and going on to provide that "all... prose-
cutions for such petitioning are illegal." 1 Win. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). See also William
Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *143 (1956), for a discussion of the critical importance of
Parliament's declaration that it was "illegal" to penalize a subject for petitioning.
23. See Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 26-27 (cited in note 8). Meritless petitions,
however, were not protected. Id. at 31. Spanbauer points out that the enactment of rules
against "vexatious suits" did not encompass petitions that" 'reflected on the house' and were not
designed or applied to squelch criticism of the government." Id. Thus, these early limits on
meritless petitions, applied primarily to judicial petitions, are the precursors of the "sham
exception" articulated by the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731 (1983), discussed in notes 74, 225 and accompanying text.
24. See Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 30-31 (cited in note 8).
25. Smith, 54"U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1173-75 (cited in note 3); Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const.
L. Q. at 32-33, 37-39 (cited in note 8).
26. Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 37 (cited in note 8).
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this era as evidence of the superiority of the petition right over other
first amendment rights in the minds of the Framers of the United
States Constitution.27 These commentators also point to the fact that
rights of petition and assembly were originally envisioned by James
Madison as an amendment separate from freedom of religion, speech,
and the press.
28
In any event, the petition right did not come into the Bill of
Rights as a separate amendment. The rights of speech, press, assem-
bly, and petition were consolidated into the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution, in no apparent textual hierarchy, in the
autumn of 1789. Significantly, the final version of the Petition Clause
describes the right to apply to "the government" for the redress of
grievances, as opposed to the right to apply to the "the legislature"
that was included in an earlier draft.29 Commentators have pointed to
this textual change as indicative of the Framers' intention to continue
the broad definition and protections of the petition right consistent
with British and colonial experience.30
B. Judicial Treatment of the Petition Clause
1. The Petition Right as a Source of Immunity
Notwithstanding its distinguished lineage, the Petition Clause
has been greatly underutilized by litigants and courts as a potential
source of rights.31 However, it has occasionally been considered by the
United States Supreme Court. In the 1960s and 1970s, in a series of
cases arising from alleged antitrust violations, the Court fashioned a
doctrine which seemed to recognize the Petition Clause as a potential
source of immunity from the penalties of conflicting federal statutory
law. In 1961, in Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight,32 the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Antitrust
27. Spanbauer writes that "[tihe existence of both state seditious libel laws and the
Federal Sedition Act coupled with the failure to prosecute petitioners under those laws indicate
that there was no original intention to raise freedom of speech and the press to the level of
protection given to petitioning." Id. at 29. See also Smith, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1174-75 (cited
in note 3).
28. Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 39 (cited in note 8).
29. Id. at 40.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 16.
32. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
1995] 1703
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Act would not be applied to punish various entities in the railroad
industry that had banded together, allegedly in violation of the Act, to
lobby Congress for changes in the law designed to drive competitors
out of business. "[N]o violation of the Act," wrote the Court, "can be
predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforce-
ment of laws.''33 Four years later, the Court in United Mine Workers
v. Pennington34 applied the same reading of the Sherman Act to per-
mit different unions to collectively petition the Secretary of Labor for
higher wages, despite the fact that the petitioning was part of a larger
scheme that clearly violated the Act.35 Notably, in Noerr the Petition
Clause received only scant mention'3 while in Pennington it was not
mentioned at all. The Court in both cases seemed more concerned
about infringement of the first amendment right of association,
emphasizing the presence of collective activity and "concerted action"
by petitioners in both cases.3 7 Nevertheless, the language used by the
Noerr Court in its careful reading of the Sherman Act clearly evokes
the themes that have shaped the petition right throughout its history:
In a representative democracy... branches of government act on behalf of the
people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends
upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representa-
tives. To hold that the government retains the power to act in this representa-
tive capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely in-
form the government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a pur-
pose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity
3 8
It wasn't until 1972, in California Motor Transport v. Trucking
Unlimited,39 that the Court acknowledged the true impact of the so-
called "Noerr-Pennington doctrine" on petition clause jurisprudence.
Trucking Unlimited involved another alleged antitrust violation, this
time on the part of a group of highway carriers who had initiated
state and federal administrative and judicial proceedings in an at-
tempt to defeat its competitors' applications for entry into the truck-
33. Id. at 135.
34. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
35. Id. at 670.
36. 365 U.S. at 138.
37. See id. at 136 ("We think it equally clear that the Sherman Act does not prohibit two
or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the
executive to take particular action with respect to a law"). The Pennington Court applied this
same reasoning to the claim before it, stating that "[t]he Sherman Act, it was held [in Noerr],
was not intended to bar concerted action of this kind even though the resulting official action
damaged other competitors at whom the [petitioning] campaign was aimed." 381 U.S. at 669.
38. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137.
39. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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ing business.40 The Court focused on the petition clause language in
Noerr, holding that the right articulated there encompassed petitions
directed toward administrative agencies and courts. Reaffirming the
broad historical view of petitioning, Justice Douglas stated that the
right to petition extends to all departments of the government.41 The
Trucking Unlimited Court also described what would become an im-
portant limitation on the petition right in the context of petitions
directed towards courts, the sham exception. Under this exception, if
a judicial petition is meritless and is obviously a mere "sham" perpe-
trated as a means to some otherwise illegal end, it will not constitute
protected activity and will thus lose whatever immunity it would have
otherwise enjoyed.42
The Petition Clause has received limited consideration as a
source of immunity in contexts other than antitrust litigation. The
Sixth and Seventh Circuits, for instance, have made reference to the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine in holding that legitimate political peti-
tioners will not incur liability under federal anti-discrimination
statutes or state defamation laws. These cases involved claims
against petitioners who had purportedly engaged in vituperative cam-
paigns aimed at forcing the removal of controversial educators from
posts in the public schools. 43
The Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that the
political petitioner will not enjoy absolute immunity regardless of the
content of the petition. In 1985, in McDonald v. Smith," the Court
dealt with a case involving a letter written to then-President Ronald
Reagan urging against the appointment of a particular candidate for
United States Attorney.45 The Court held that the letter writer, who
had allegedly made false and damaging accusations against the
40. Id. at 509.
41. Id. at 510.
42. Id. at 511.
43. See Eaton v. Newport Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that groups
of parents who had campaigned to have an allegedly racist school principal removed from his job
were immune from liability under the principal's civil rights claim); Stachura v. Truszkowski,
763 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a parent who had successfully lobbied the school
board for the dismissal of a teacher for improper teaching of sex education was immune from
suit for her actions), rev'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d.
394 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that a parent-teacher organization that exerted pressure on a school
board to terminate an elementary school principal had neither defamed nor conspired to violate
the civil rights of the principal). Such activity clearly falls into the category of political
petitioning. See note 216-221 and accompanying text.
44. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
45. Id. at 480-81.
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candidate, would not be shielded by the Petition Clause from liability
for damages under state libel law.46 Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, acknowledged the ancient pedigree of the petition right, and
admitted that petitioners had sometimes been granted immunity from
libel laws by early American courts.47  Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that the petition right was never meant to be elevated to
"special First Amendment status. 48  In language often quoted by
lower courts looking for some indication of the scope of the right, the
Court declared that "the right to petition is cut from the same cloth as
the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment. 49 The petition right,
the Court held, had been "inspired by the same ideals of liberty and
democracy"5 as the other first amendment rights, such as free speech
and press, and therefore a libelous petition should not be immune
from the penalties to which libelous speech would be subjected under
similar circumstances.
The McDonald opinion has been criticized by scholars who
believe history shows that the right to petition the government must
be absolute to be politically meaningful.51 Nevertheless, McDonald is
one of the few cases in which the Supreme Court has specifically
attempted to define the nature and scope of the modern petition right,
and as such has been cited by almost every federal court that has
dealt with a petition clause issue in the past decade.5 2 However, as
will be demonstrated in the following materials, McDonald's
application in other contexts, particularly in cases involving a right of
access to courts claim, is problematic.
46. Id. at 485.
47. Id. at 484. The McDonald Court relied on White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266 (1845), in
which a letter writer who had urged the President to remove a customs inspector from office
was held to be liable if he had acted with "express malice," as supporting the proposition that
the political petition privilege was never meant to be absolute. But see Spanbauer, 21 Hastings
Const. L. Q. at 54-55 (cited in note 8), calling the Court's reliance on White "infirm." Spanbauer
contends that White contradicted the law in the majority of American jurisdictions. She
suggests that the McDonald Court should have looked instead at Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyler
129 (Vt. 1802), in which the Supreme Court granted immunity to a defendant who had
submitted a petition to the Vermont legislature requesting that the plaintiff not be reappointed
to office. The McDonald Court did mention Harris but dismissed the holding as reflecting "an
early English view." 472 U.S. at 483.
48. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485.
49. Id. at 482. See note 112 for a list of cases citingMcDonald.
50. 472 U.S. at 485.
51. See Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 55-56 (cited in note 8); Smith, 54 U. Cin.
L. Rev. at 1153 (cited in note 3).
52. See note 112 and accompanying text.
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2. Right of Access to the Courts
The second main context in which petition clause claims have
arisen is when plaintiffs claim that they have been prevented from, or
punished for,53 initiating judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. As
mentioned, the wording of the Petition Clause, which provides for a
right to apply "to government" for a redress of grievances, seems to
include within its protection the right to petition courts and adminis-
trative tribunals. In fact, a very vague "right of access" to the appro-
priate mechanisms for obtaining judicial redress of grievances has
been periodically recognized by the Supreme Court, although not
always in the context of a petition clause discussion. For instance, in
a line of cases involving the constitutionality of court filing fees, the
Supreme Court described the would-be litigant's right to have his case
heard as emanating from the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. 54 However, in a separate line of cases decided during roughly
the same time period, the Court held that the Petition Clause man-
dated that state prisoners wishing to file habeas corpus petitions be
given "meaningful access" to federal courts.55
The Court relied on the latter cases in California Motor
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited,56 when it declared the right of
access to the courts to be a component of the first amendment right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances. 57 The Court held
that highway carriers' attempts to eliminate competition by initiating
non-sham litigation challenging the applications of rival carriers
constituted protected activity under the Petition Clause.58 Unlike the
prisoner cases, the judicial petitioning taking place in Trucking
Unlimited was collective activity. Thus, first amendment association
53. A "meaningful" right of access to courts, as the term is used in this Recent
Development, refers not only to the plaintiffs ability to gain initial access to a court, but also to
be free from the fear of retaliation for doing so. Unless the fear of reprisal is removed, the right
becomes meaningless. See Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 19, 26 (cited in note 8)
(describing the development of a "meaningful" petition right).
54. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971) (holding that Due Process re-
quires states to waive court costs for indigents in divorce cases); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S.
656 (1973) (holding that state laws requiring appellate filing fees do not violate the Due Process
and Equal Process Clauses since they do not impact the initial right to be heard).
55. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).
See also note 53.
56. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).





interests were implicated as well as the petition clause right of access
to courts. Indeed, some scholars have contended that the only context
in which the Supreme Court has been willing to find first amendment
petition clause protection in civil actions has been in cases where
some other first amendment interest was threatened in the event that
meaningful access to judicial remedies was denied.19
Support for this contention can be found in a trilogy of cases
decided by the Court in the 1960s: NAACP v. Button;6 Brotherhood of
Rrailroad Trainmen v. Virginia;61 and United Mine Workers v. Illinois
State Bar.6 2 Button involved attempts by the NAACP to solicit
attorneys and to finance litigation aimed at ending racial
discrimination.63 In holding that such activities were immune from
state laws prohibiting the solicitation of attorneys, the Court
acknowledged the petition clause interest in the minority litigants'
attempt to gain access to the judicial system. 4 However, the Court
primarily focused on the constitutional magnitude of the civil rights
struggle that gave rise to the underlying litigation, as well as on the
presence of political speech and association interests of the
petitioners.65 In Trainmen and United Mine Workers, cases involving
the collective hiring of attorneys by unions, the Court explained that
the underlying litigation in a right of access case need not be "bound
up with political matters of acute social moment, as in Button."
'66
Again, these cases involved collective petitioning activity, and again
the Court's focus rested on the association interests involved,67 not on
defining exactly what sort of right the Petition Clause guaranteed to
would-be litigants.
A few lower federal courts, when pressed to acknowledge the
issue, have concluded from these supreme court decisions that no
substantive right of access emanates solely from the Petition Clause.
Individual civil litigants, unable to claim the first amendment asso-
ciation interests implicated in Trucking Unlimited, Trainmen, and
United Mine Workers, have in some cases been denied meaningful
59. See Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 45 (cited in note 8).
60. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
61. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
62. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
63. 371 U.S. at 443-44.
64. Id. at 428-30.
65. Id. at 430-31.
66. United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223. The Court in United Mine Workers explained
that it was following the controlling precedent of Trainmen. Both cases involved litigation
"solely designed to compensate the victims of industrial accidents." Id.
67. In United Mine Workers, the Court referred to the first amendment right to "assemble
peaceably," but was clearly talking about the right of association as well. Id. at 222-23.
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access to a court unless they can point to an underlying issue of con-
stitutional magnitude inherent in their cause of action.68 Courts ad-
hering to this view will likely find a first amendment right of access to
courts only in a conjunctive reading of the amendment. This analysis
necessarily requires the presence of some additional first amendment
interest to buttress the petition clause right of access claim. 69
There is evidence, however, that the Supreme Court intended
the right of access to courts recognized in Trucking Unlimited to ad-
here to individual civil litigants, not merely to groups. In 1983, in Bill
Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB,70 the Court applied its holding in
Trucking Unlimited to a case where a picketing employee sought to
have her employer's state court proceeding against her enjoined as an
unfair labor practice.71 The Court refused to allow the NLRB to enjoin
the employer's lawsuit, holding that "going to a judicial body for re-
dress of alleged wrongs... stands apart from other forms of action di-
rected at the alleged wrongdoer. ' '72 The Court held that the em-
ployer's right of access to a court was too important to be censured as
an unfair labor practice, even when the sole object of the lawsuit was
to enjoin an employee from exercising a protected right.7 3 Bill
Johnson's Restaurants is mostly cited by lower courts for its detailed
reiteration of the sham exception articulated in Trucking Unlimited74
But these two cases, viewed together, provide strong support for the
contention that the Petition Clause, and the Petition Clause alone,
can anchor an individual civil litigant's right of access claim.
Some lower federal courts have cited Trucking Unlimited in
recognizing many kinds of judicial petitioning, including private
68. See, for example, Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir. 1984). The court held that
there was no right of access to courts claim for a policeman who was demoted to foot patrol in
retaliation for filing a civil rights lawsuit against his employer. The court cited Buttons as
supporting the proposition that "a private office dispute cannot be constitutionalized merely by
filing a legal action." Id. at 1244 n.10.
69. See, for example, Day v. South Park Independent School Dist., 768 F.2d 696, 701-702
(5th Cir. 1985) (denying petitioner's right of access claim and holding that "decisions that rest in
part on the right-to-petition clause involve the exercise of first amendment rights in addition to
the right to petition"). For a more detailed description of the holding in Day, see notes 116-118
and accompanying text.
70. 461 U.S. 733 (1983).
71. Id. at 731. In this case, when a waitress picketed her employer's restaurant in protest,
the owner filed a lawsuit against her in state court, claiming that she was unlawfully
interfering with his business.
72. Id. at 741 (quoting Peddie Buildings, 203 N.L.R.B. 265, 272 (1973), enf. denied on
other grounds, 498 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1974)).
73. Id.
74. See note 225 and accompanying text.
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grievance claims filed by individual litigants, as activity protected
under the Petition Clause1 5 or, more vaguely, under the "right of
access to the courts secured under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 17 6 When an individual encounters retaliation for filing
a judicial petition, these courts hold that there are sufficient grounds
for the petitioner to state a claim under the appropriate statute77 for
infringement of her constitutionally protected right of access.
According to these courts, a plaintiff states a right of access to courts
claim by reference to the act of petitioning itself, with no additional
first amendment interest needed to buttress the claim78
Even assuming the existence of a substantive right of access to
courts emanating from the Petition Clause and triggered merely by an
individual's invocation of the judicial process, the scope of such a right
is unclear. For even if the petition clause right of access is found to
stand alone, coequal to (although admittedly, in most cases, inter-
twined with) its first amendment counterparts, that does not neces-
sarily render this right immune from all limitations. After all, other
first amendment rights such as the freedoms of speech and the press
have been subjected to numerous limitations throughout the years. In
attempting to determine the scope of the petition right, in general,
and the right of access to courts, in particular, American courts have
lacked even the limited precedential guidance they received in strug-
gling to determine the existence of these rights.
75. See Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Com'n, 780 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1986). The
court in Harrison held that if the plaintiff could show that government officials filed a frivolous
condemnation counterclaim to induce him to settle his suit, a right of access claim would be
established. The court contended that "state officials may not take retaliatory action against an
individual designed either to punish him for having exercised his constitutional right to seek
judicial relief or to intimidate or chill his exercise of that right in the future." Id. at 1428.
76. Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 958-59 (6th Cir. 1986). Despite the vague language,
these courts clearly recognize a right of access to courts emanating from the Petition Clause, not
from an amalgamation of first amendment rights. See id. at 959 (holding that a plaintiff
arguably stated a right of access claim when he alleged that he was kicked off the football team
in retaliation for filing a lawsuit in state court, and noting that "[a] number of federal circuit
courts have likewise found the right of access to the courts to be protected by the First
Amendment"); Fuchilla v. Prockop, 682 F. Supp. 247 (D. N.J. 1987) (holding that a plaintiff who
contended that she was discharged for filing an action in state court against her former boss had
stated a right of access to courts claim).
77. Right of access to courts claims by public employees who claim that they have been
retaliated against by their employers for initiating judicial proceedings will usually be filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988 ed. & Supp. V), which states that "[e]very person
who ... subjects ... any citizen of the United States.. . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in [a] ... proper proceeding for redress." The plaintiff in San Fillippo brought his
Petition Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 30 F.3d at 426.
78. See note 76.
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In the absence of any definitive statements from the Supreme
Court on the matter, two rather extreme views have emerged. The
first theory, to which the majority of lower federal courts have
adhered, is that the petition right, including the right of access to
courts, may permissibly be subjected to exactly the same limitations
as would other, more clearly defined, first amendment rights under
similar circumstances. For support, these courts draw mainly on
vague supreme court pronouncements that the petition right is "cut
from the same cloth '7 9 and "intimately connected '80 with the other
first amendment guarantees. At the other end of the spectrum are a
group of scholars who contend that the petition right is fundamentally
different from, and superior to, the other first amendment rights.
Proponents of this theory point to the rich history of petitioning to
support their conclusion that the modern petition right should be
absolute, or nearly so.81 This view of the petition right would confer
the same lofty status on all petitions, regardless of their content or
the context in which they are presented.82
As will be demonstrated, bits and pieces of both of these theo-
ries influenced the Third Circuit's decision in San Filippo v.
Bongiovanni. But in order to fully understand the San Filippo court's
effort to stake out a workable middle ground between these radically
different formulations of the scope of the petition right, it is necessary
to step back a bit from petition clause analysis. The next Part of this
Recent Development will examine the retaliatory discharge cause of
action that is the subject of the discussion in San Filippo as it
developed in the context of claims of impingement of the first
amendment right of free speech.
79. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482.
80. United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 222.
81. See generally Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 15 (cited in note 8); Smith, 54 U.
Cin. L. Rev. at 1153 (cited in note 3). See also note 209 and accompanying text.
82. This view of the entire petition right as absolute does not allow for the different




C. First Amendment Rights of Public Employees
1. Free Speech v. Workplace Harmony: The Pickering Balancing Test
Courts have long recognized the potential conflict between the
first amendment interests of public employees and the interests of
their governmental employers (and the public) in maintaining a modi-
cum of control and harmony in the tax-funded workplace. As Justice
Holmes succinctly put it, "[A] policeman may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.."83 This view, which essentially resulted in a forfeiture of
first amendment speech rights by citizens wishing to obtain and
maintain public employment, prevailed in American jurisprudence
until the middle of this century.84 Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s,
the Supreme Court placed greater importance on the public
employee's speech rights, while still recognizing that the
government's interest as an employer may justify restrictions upon
the exercise of those rights in some cases. In Pickering v. Board of
Education, School District 20585 a case in which a school teacher was
dismissed for criticizing his school board's allocation of funds among
athletic and educational programs, the Court held that courts
considering such cases must strike a balance between the interest of
citizens in commenting upon matters of public concern and the state's
interest in promoting the efficiency of public services performed
through its employees.86 The Court explained that this balancing test
would be applied on a case-by-case basis, taking into account not only
the disruptive impact of the speech in the workplace, but also the
content of the speech itself.87
83. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
84. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that it was "too late in the
day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege"). Since the late 1960s, it has been settled that
a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 605-606 (1967); Pickering v. Board of Education, School District 205, 391 U.S. 563
(1968); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Branti u. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-516
(1980).
85. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
86. Id. at 568.
87. Id. at 568-69.
[Vol. 48:1697
PETITION RIGHT
The balancing test derived from Pickering, which is still used
by courts in retaliatory discharge cases, 88 has evolved into a four-step
analysis. First, the employee must demonstrate that she has engaged
in protected activity, such as exercising her right of free speech.
Second, the employee must demonstrate that her speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment decision.
Third, once the employee has successfully demonstrated the first two
factors, the burden of production shifts to the governmental employer,
who must articulate a legitimate, business-related reason for the
employment decision. A legitimate reason may be related to the
speech itself; for instance, the employer may point to the fact that an
employee's speech was insubordinate, or was disruptive or disturbing
to coworkers. The court must then weigh the competing interests of
the employee and the employer.89 If the employer's interest in
workplace harmony and efficiency outweighs the employee's speech
interest in a particular situation, the employer will not be held liable
for the retaliatory discharge. Finally, even if the employee prevails
under the first three prongs, the employer may still avoid liability by
proving that it would have made the same employment decision
regardless of the presence of the protected activity at issue.
2. Connick v. Myers: The Public Concern Threshold
After Pickering, it appeared that speech on matters of public
concern, such as the criticism of fund allocation at a public school,
would receive greater weight in an interest balancing test than speech
on a purely private matter. The importance of the public concern
criterion was made clear in the Supreme Court's holding in Connick v.
Myers.90 In Connick the Court considered a case where an assistant
district attorney had circulated a questionnaire among fellow staff
members, requesting their views on certain office policies and prac-
tices with which she disagreed91 She was later terminated for
refusing to accept a transfer and for distributing the questionnaire, an
88. See Mike Harper, Connick v. Myers and the First Amendment Rights of Public
Employees, 16 Hastings CommlEnt. L. J. 525 (1994), for a more detailed description of the four-
part test that evolved from Pickering.
89. This step does not involve the production of additional evidence, and is thus left out of
the analytical framework by some courts, which refer instead to a three-step balancing test. For
example, the magistrate judge who originally considered the retaliatory discharge claim in San
Filippo described a three-step balancing test. 30 F.3d at 430. See note 157.
90. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
91. Id. at 140-41.
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effort which her superiors called an "act of insubordination."9 2 She
subsequently brought a civil rights action claiming that she had been
unlawfully discharged for exercising her right of free speech.93 Before
considering the merits of the claim, the Connick Court articulated a
threshold requirement for triggering judicial scrutiny of public
employee retaliatory discharge claims premised on an alleged
impingement of free speech.94 The court held that unless an element
of public concern is found in the speech that allegedly motivated the
discharge, no balancing test will be applied to the claim.95 In fact, no
judicial recourse whatsoever will be available to the adversely
impacted public employee, at least not as relates to the alleged
impingement of her first amendment interests. Such a result may
seem unfair, the Connick Court noted, but the Court's obligation to
protect public employees' speech interests "does not require a grant of
immunity for employee grievances not afforded by the First
Amendment to those who do not work for the state. 96 Applying the
newly articulated public concern test to the facts of the case before it,
the Connick Court held that the discharged district attorney's
questionnaire contained speech on purely private, internal office
matters, and described her first amendment claim as an "attempt to
constitutionalize an employee grievance. '9 7
3. Application of Connick to Petition Clause Claims
The so-called "Connick public concern test" has been subjected
to criticism, mostly regarding the vague criteria provided by the Court
for determining exactly what kind of speech constitutes a matter of
92. Id. at 141.
93. Id. One commentator argues that the employee's claim in Connick should or at least
could have been a petition claim, pointing out that "[iln Connick v. Myers, an assistant district
attorney was fired for having prepared and distributed a questionnaire seeking views of fellow
staff members on office transfer policy, morale, and the need for an office grievance committee.
She was collecting the views of her fellow workers to present to her superiors-classic
petitioning activity." Smith, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1195 (cited in note 3).
94. 461 U.S. at 138. As the Court stated, "When a public employee speaks not as a citizen
for matters of public concern, but instead as an employer for matters of only personal interest,
absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the wisdom of a personal decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to an
employee's behavior." Id. Thus, under Connick, a court's determination of whether an
employee's speech relates to a matter of public concern is crucial.
95. Id. Another way of articulating this result is that the claim would automatically fail
at the first prong of the Pickering test, since the speech involved does not constitute "protected
activity."
96. 461 U.S. at 146-47.
97. Id. at 154.
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public concern. 8  Federal circuit courts have offered various, and
sometimes conflicting, definitions of "issues of public concern. 99
However, the dividing line between speech on matters of public and
private concern in the context of a retaliatory discharge claim has
never been seriously questioned and has been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court since Connick.100 Tricky interpretative issues have
arisen, however, when public employees claim that their first
amendment rights other than free speech have been impinged by an
adverse employment decision. For instance, employees who have
allegedly encountered retaliation on the basis of their speech
commonly claim that their rights of free association have been
impinged upon as well.1Ol This intermingling of speech and
association claims in a retaliatory discharge case is understandable;
after all, an employee must have been speaking to someone when she
uttered the objectionable words, presumably to an audience with
whom she has chosen to associate and share her views. The
association interest attached to the speech is even greater if the
speaker is a union member or has spoken through channels provided
to the employee through some type of collective undertaking.102 The
98. The Connick Court held that "whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as re-
vealed by the whole record." Id. at 147-48. Whether speech meets the public concern threshold
is a matter of law to be decided by the court. Commentators have pointed to the danger that the
values of individual judges might creep into this kind of analysis. For criticism of this vague
standard, see Harper, 16 Hastings Comm/Ent. L. J. at 534-36 (cited in note 88). See generally J.
Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 483 (1985).
99. See, for example, Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d. 635, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reversing the
district court's summary judgment for the FBI, which had fired a Chinese-American employee
after her husband had sent letters to the FBI director complaining of race discrimination). In
Tao, the court held that "[w]hile an individual personnel dispute does not generally constitute a
matter of public concern, an employee's speech aimed at resolving a personnel dispute may
touch upon an issue of public concern.... [T]he fact that Tao was motivated by her own desire
to be promoted does not prevent her statement about racial discrimination from being pro-
tected." Id. at 639-40. Compare this to the Seventh Circuit's position in Smith v. Fruin, 28
F.3d. 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe fact that an employee speaks up on a topic that may be
deemed one of public import does not automatically render his remarks on that subject
protected. The content and form of the employee's remarks, along with the underlying circum-
stances, including the employee's reasons for speaking, remain essential to this determination).
100. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 (1987) (holding that a public employee's
statement "if they go for him again, I hope they get him," concerning the assassination attempt
on then-President Reagan, "plainly dealt with a matter of public concern'). For a more recent
reaffirmation of the public concern test see Churchill v. Waters, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
101 See, for example, Broderick v. Roach, 767 F. Supp. 20, 25 n.9 (D. Mass. 1991); Schalk
v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 494, 497 (10th Cir. 1990).
102. The filing of a formal grievance would be an example of such behavior, if the grievance
was a product of a united employee effort or collective bargaining by an employee's union.
When the filing of a formal grievance initiates some sort of quasi-judicial proceeding, there is
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1697
lower federal courts have been about evenly split regarding whether
the Connick public concern test should be applied to an association
impingement claim.103
Most courts that have applied Connick have simply quoted the
"cut from the same cloth" language from McDonald and other cases in
holding that all first amendment rights should be given the same
treatment. 10 4  Others have held, more narrowly, that because
association interests were implicated in Connick (and Pickering),
Connick applies to all factually similar situations involving closely
connected speech and association claims. 0 5 The courts that have not
applied Connick to association claims have recognized in the facts of
their cases some interest, separate from speech, that has traditionally
received broader protection than speech.06
Though less often recognized by either plaintiffs or courts, a
petition interest is often also at stake in first amendment retaliatory
discharge cases. For instance, submitting complaints, criticisms, or
suggestions to a superior, whether an individual or an entity such as
an administrative board, when the superior is a state actor with the
arguably a petition interest involved here as well. For further discussion see notes 227-232 and
accompanying text.
103. Harper, 16 Hastings Comm/Ent L. J. at 542-44 (cited in note 88).
104. See Broaderick, 767 F. Supp. at 25 n.9 (holding Connick applicable to negotiated union
grievances with no specific reference to association rights, focusing on the question of whether
the plaintiffs statements to the press were protected speech).
105. See Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Pickering and Connick, while
themselves speech cases, are based upon freedom of association cases. We perceive no logical
reason for differentiating between speech and association in applying Connick to first
amendment claims); Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[A]lthough
Connick did not specifically refer to associational rights in drawing the distinction between
speech on matters of public concern and matters of private concern, Connick acknowledged that
the governing precedent, Pickering, was rooted in cases dealing with speech and association
rights'; Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Public Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 400 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding
that Connick governed the association claim of a teacher fired for putting a complaining letter in
a faculty newsletter because that claim is based on speech that does not implicate association
rights to any significantly greater degree than the employee speech at issue in Connick). Such
holdings seem to leave room for Petition Clause right of access claims unhindered by the public
concern test, since right of access was not implicated in Pickering or Connick.
106. See Hatcher v. Board of Public Educ., 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
that when a teacher says she encountered retaliation for bringing her minister to a school board
meeting Connick does not apply, since such a restriction would "exact a substantial toll upon
first amendment liberties'; Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that no independent proof of public concern is required in a freedom of association
claim arising from union organization activity). For criticism of this approach see Mark
Strauss, Public Employees' Freedom of Association: Should Connick v. Myers Speech-Based
Public-Concern Rule Apply?, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 473 (1992). Professor Strauss contends that
"courts holding Connick inapplicable to association claims.., have undermined the Court's
expressive association doctrine. Plaintiffs deprived of free speech claims by Connick, but whose
expressive activities happened to involve groups, have been permitted to proceed under the
rubric of freedom of association." Id. at 486.
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power to respond or provide redress of some kind, might arguably be
termed petitioning activity.1°7 This type of petitioning, however, is so
intertwined with the exercise of free speech and association that it is
seldom recognized and singled out as the basis of an independent
claim.108
The invocation of the Petition Clause usually arises as a right
of access to courts claim, in cases where an adverse employment deci-
sion has been made after an employee initiated some judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding against the employer. Clearly, a situation involv-
ing an employee who has brought a lawsuit against her employer
would fall into this category. But more commonly these claims
involve employees who have initiated some sort of formal, quasi-
judicial grievance procedure. 0 9 By bringing these right of access
claims in addition to, or in lieu of, speech impingement claims,
plaintiff employees have attempted to sidestep the Connick public
concern requirement. Such attempts, however, have met almost
universal failure. From 1983 to 1993, every federal appellate court
that considered a petition clause claim in a first amendment
retaliatory discharge case decided that the Connick test should
apply."0 Unlike cases involving association claims, courts have been
107. For example, one commentator called the activities of the district attorney in Connick
"classic petitioning activity." Smith, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1195 (cited in note 3). See note 93
and accompanying text. Keep in mind, however, that while a superior may be able to respond to
such a "petition," she has no obligation to do so. San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 439. Under the
analytical framework used in this Recent Development, this lack of obligation would make such
a petition political, purely expressive in nature, akin to mere speech and appropriately subject
to the Connick public concern threshold. See notes 216-221 and accompanying text.
108. The failure of the Connick Court to recognize the plaintiffs activity as political peti-
tioning is a perfect example of this kind of oversight. See note 107.
109. Some commentators have asserted that there is no right of access to courts interest in
filing a grievance. See Strauss, 61 Fordham L. Rev. at 478 n.31 (cited in note 106). Professor
Strauss contends that "[wihen the Supreme Court speaks of the... right to petition... it is
referring to the right to appeal to the legislature and the judicial system-not the right to
challenge a decision of the government as an employer." Id. at 486. But courts have generally
treated these "grievance" cases the same as cases in which lawsuits have been filed, making no
attempt to differentiate between the two in discussions of whether to recognize a right of access
to courts interest. The court in San Filippo follows this approach as well. See notes 216-221
and accompanying text.
110. See 63 U.S.L.W. 1017 (August 9, 1994) (reporting the circuit split created by the Third
Circuit with its rejection of the public concern criteria in San Filippo). See also White Plains
Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1059 (2d Cir. 1993); Day, 768 F.2d at 703; Rathjen v.
Litchfield, 878 F.3d 836, 842 (5th Cir. 1989); Rice v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 887 F.2d 716, 720-21
(6th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1001 (1990); Altman, 734 F.2d at 1244 n.10;
Belk v. Town of Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (7th Cir. 1988); Gearhart v. Thorne, 768 F.2d
1072, 1073 (9th Cir. 1985); Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714, 715 (11th Cir. 1989); Boyle v.
Burke, 925 F.2d 497, 505-06 (1st Cir. 1991).
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generally unwilling to recognize in the petition clause right of access
an interest sufficiently independent of speech to require a separate
analysis.
The reactions of courts to petition clause right of access claims
in retaliatory discharge cases has fallen into one of four general cate-
gories. In the first group are courts that have taken the time-honored
approach of essentially ignoring the petition interest. These courts
focus solely on the nature of the speech contained in the petition, and
often do not even mention the Petition Clause by name in their
analyses."' The second group includes courts that have ac-
knowledged the petition interest but applied Connick, usually with
little discussion except for the usual citation to the McDonald "cut
from the same cloth" language, or to other general supreme court
pronouncements on the petition right from cases outside the retali-
atory discharge context."2 These courts come to the conclusion that
whether a retaliatory discharge action is characterized as a speech
claim or a petition claim is irrelevant because the interest involved
and the appropriate analytical framework are the same in either case.
A typical example of this kind of reasoning can be found in the
Eighth Circuit's opinion in Hoffman v. Mayor of Liberty."1 In that
case the court, considering the claim of a former police detective who
said he had been demoted after filing a grievance, cited McDonald as
demonstrating that the three categories of protected expression set
out in the First Amendment are all essentially coequal rights of
111. See Renfroe, 722 F.2d at 714 (holding that a written grievance filed by a school teacher
protesting the decision that she share a job was not a matter of public concern, and that
therefore, her discharge would not be scrutinized). The court made no specific mention of the
Petition Clause, mentioning only the "speech" contained in the grievance. See also Altman v.
Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240 (1984) (7th Cir. 1984) (making no mention of the Petition Clause in
holding that a policeman who claimed that he was disciplined because he filed a lawsuit for
violation of his civil rights was not protected by the First Amendment); Rice, 887 F.2d at 720
(never explicitly acknowledging a separate petition clause issue, stating that "not every job-
related grievance of a public employee is a matter of public concern." The court addressed only
the speech involved, even though the employee had filed a discrimination charge against his
employer); Boyle, 925 F.2d at 505 ("In Connick, the Supreme Court struck a balance between
the speech rights of the employee as a citizen and the interests of the State as employer and
provider of essential services.... Thus, the public employee's right to petition the government
with respect to matters of public concern has been clearly established since Connick, at least").
Again, the petition right is essentially ignored, and the focus of the discussion is speech.
112. For citations to McDonald, see Day, 768 F.2d at 701; Belk, 858 F.2d at 1261, Gray v.
Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Hoffman v. Mayor of Liberty, 905 F.2d 229, 233 (8th
Cir. 1990). See also White Plains, 991 F.2d at 1059 (citing McDonald and Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 n.11 (1985) (for the proposition that the petition right is "generally
subject to the same constitutional analysis" as the right to free speech)).
113. 905 F.2d 229 (8th Cir. 1990).
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expression. 114 While the court recognized that the right of petition
could be exercised differently from the right of free speech, it
concluded that the Petition Clause provided no lesser or greater
guarantees of free expression than the Free Speech Clause.
Consequently, the court did not feel compelled to determine in what
way the Petition Clause was distinct from the Speech Clause or
whether Hoffman's grievance filing was an act of petition or speech.
115
Some courts applying Connick to petition clause right of access
claims have gone beyond the "cut from the same cloth" rationale,
focusing on the inequities that could result if "special treatment" were
given to speech on a matter of private concern simply because it is
contained in a petition. For instance, in Day v. South Park
Independent School District,"5 the Fifth Circuit held that a public
school teacher fired in retaliation for filing a formal grievance was not
entitled to first amendment protection since the subject of the
grievance was the teacher's protest against an unfavorable job
evaluation, a matter of purely private concern. 117  In applying
Connick, the court acknowledged the plaintiffs petition clause claim
but rejected her contention that her petitioning activity was entitled
to greater protection than her speech alone would have been. 1 8 The
Seventh Circuit has voiced similar concerns in cases such as Belk v.
Town of Minoqua,1 9 where the court held that "special treatment" of
the petition right would unjustly favor those who "through foresight
or mere fortuity" present their otherwise unprotected speech in the
form of a petition.120
The third group of courts applying Connick to petition clause
claims, have hinted, however, that under certain circumstances, not
present in the cases before them, application of the public concern test
to a petition clause claim might be inappropriate. For instance, in
Schalk v. Gallemore,121 the Tenth Circuit seemed to suggest that
114. Id. at 232. The three categories of protected expression are religion and its practice,
speech and its publication, and assembly and petition of the government. Id.
115. Id. at 233.
116. 768 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1985).
117. Id. at 701.
118. Id. The court stated, "None of the.., cases cited by Defendant supports the proposi-
tion that her speech on a matter of personal concern.., is protected by the Petition Clause
because she chose to clothe her address to them in a formal grievance." Id.
119. 858 F.2d. 1258 (7th Cir. 1988). The court in San Filippo takes direct issue with Belk
and the "injustice" argument. See notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
120. 858 F.2d at 1262.
121. 906 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1990).
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speech and petition interests, though inseparable in a case involving a
complaining letter addressed to a hospital board, might be severable
in certain situations. The court in Schalk, however, did not explicitly
state what such circumstances might be. In Stalter v. City of
Montgomery,122 an Alabama district court held that Connick was ap-
plicable in situations involving the filing of non-union employee griev-
ances, since these types of petitions were within the realm of private
office disputes to which Connick expressly denied constitutional scru-
tiny.123 But the court in Stalter seemed to suggest that had the em-
ployee brought an access to courts claim, or a claim in which his asso-
ciation rights were implicated, a different analysis might have been
required.12
4
Finally, a very small fourth group of district courts have sim-
ply declined to apply Connick to public employees' petition clause
impingement claims. The rationales provided by these courts have
varied, depending on the type of petition involved. In Stellmaker v.
DePetrillo,125 the court held that the right of a public employee to file
grievances under procedures established through collective bargain-
ing implicated both petition and association rights and that the
Connick analysis was therefore inapplicable. The court cited Bill
Johnson's Restaurants126 in support of the contention that access to
procedures for the redress of grievances is essential to a meaningful
first amendment right to petition the government. The Court further
noted that despite some broad language in the Supreme Court's
opinion, Connick dealt only with freedom of speech and not the other
first amendment rights of association and petition.127 The court in
Gavrilles v. O'Connor12s came to a similar conclusion, holding that the
state may not abridge the right of public employees to associate in a
labor union and to seek redress of grievances through collective ac-
tion.129 But these cases do not make clear whether a petition claim
122. 796 F.Supp. 489 (M.D. Ala. 1992). This case involved a firefighter who had filed a
grievance after being required to shave his chest hair.
123. Id. at 494.
124. Id. at 495. The court pointed to Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Com'n, 780
F.2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir. 1986), and McCoy v. Goldin, 598 F. Supp. 310, 314-15 (S.D. N.Y. 1984),
as supporting a right of access to courts to which the Connick test would not apply.
125. 710 F. Supp. 891 (D. Conn. 1989).
126. 461 U.S. at 731, 741.
127. Stellmaker, 710 F. Supp. at 892.
128. 579 F. Supp. 301, 304 (D. Mass. 1984).
129. Id. See also Professional Ass'n of College Educators, TSTAINEA v. El Paso County
Community College Dist., 730 F.2d 258, 263, 270 (5th Cir. 1984) (recognizing protection for filing




alone, minus an accompanying association interest, would merit a
separate analysis. In fact, the court in Stellmaker distinguished from
its decision the application of Connick to petition claims where the
grievance procedures involved had been established not through
collective bargaining, but by the employer. The Court noted that in
such situations, the right to associate was not implicated. 130 Possibly,
these decisions follow the usual approach of subordinating the peti-
tion right to another more clearly defined first amendment right by
substituting association for speech.
A few federal district courts have held that a petition clause
impingement claim, in the form of an invocation of the right of access
to courts, is distinct from a speech claim. In McCoy v. Goldin, 1 the
district court declined to apply Connick to the claim of radio
repairmen who challenged a wage agreement on the grounds that it
included a provision precluding the repairmen from bringing
individual legal claims against their municipal employer. McCoy is
not, strictly speaking, a retaliatory discharge case, but its holding
that the right of access to the courts cannot be characterized in terms
of public concern 32 seems readily applicable to the claims of public
employees who contend that their employers have retaliated against
them for bringing judicial petitions. The court in McCoy dismissed
the entire Pickering/ Connick balancing test as an inappropriate
analytical framework for a right of access to courts claim.-9
Similarly, in Fuchilla v. Prockop,34 when a former secretary at a state
university contended that she had been discharged for filing an action
in state court against her boss, the court cited Trucking Unlimited in
noting that courts have found the right of access to courts to be
protected under the First Amendment without having to engage in a
public concern analysis. 35
Until 1994 no federal circuit court had failed to apply Connick
to any petition clause claim, whether right of access to courts or
130. 710 F. Supp. at 893. The court cited Day, 768 F.2d at 696, and Renfroe, 722 F.2d at
714, as being inapplicable to retaliatory discharge claims involving collective bargaining
agreements.
131. 598 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
132. Id. at 315 n.4. The court in McCoy described the right of access to the courts as
emanating not only from the Petition Clause but also from the Due Process Clause. Id. at 315
(citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 817, 821).
133. Id. The McCoy Court held that "Ithe right of access to the courts cannot be infringed
upon or burdened. It is as fundamental a right as any person may hold." Id.
134. 682 F. Supp. 247 (D. N.J. 1987).
135. Id. at 262.
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otherwise, in the retaliatory discharge context. In 1990, however, the
Third Circuit hinted at things to come in its holding in Bradley v.
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ. 3 6 In that case, a public school teacher who
had been criticized for engaging in controversial teaching practices
claimed that he had been fired for, among other things, filing a
workers' compensation claim with the state unemployment
compensation board.137 In considering the teacher's petition clause
retaliatory discharge claim, the district court determined that the
plaintiff, who had fied a claim before the appropriate tribunal as
designated by state law, could be properly characterized as a
"petitioner." Nevertheless, the court dismissed the claim, refusing to
"constitutionalize a state tort.138 The Third Circuit ultimately re-
manded the case for factual inquiry on the issue of causation between
the filing of the workers' compensation claim and the discharge, and
so did not have to face the question of whether Connick should apply
to the case.3 9 However, the court devoted some attention to the
question of whether or not a workers' compensation claim should
qualify as a first amendment "petition." Although Trucking
Unlimited made clear that the right to petition extended to "all de-
partments of government," and the prisoner cases such as Bounds v.
Smith and Johnson v. Avery acknowledged that "resort to the courts
falls within the right to petition,' ' 40 it was nonetheless an open ques-
tion whether resort to an administrative tribunal for the purpose of
filing a personal injury claim was meant to be afforded constitutional
protection.141
Likewise, it was unclear whether a petition must possess a
degree of communicative intent similar to that which was present in
Trucking Unlimited and beyond that present in a mundane workers'
compensation claim to enjoy first amendment petition clause
protection142 The very fact that the court in Bradley asked these
questions and took such pains to consider whether or not the
plaintiffs activity constituted a first amendment "petition" suggests
that the answer to that question would have made a difference in its
decision whether or not to apply Connick. Arguably, had the court
found a legitimate petition, it might not have followed its sister cir-
136. 913 F.2d 1064 (3d Cir. 1990).
137. Id. at 1075.
138. Id. at 1075.
139. Id. at 1076.
140. Id. (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, and Johnson, 393 U.S. at 483).
141. Id.
142. See id. (citing Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 508).
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cults in automatically applying the public concern threshold to a
petition clause right of access to courts claim.143 But the answer to
that question would have to wait for four years, until the Third
Circuit's holding in San Filippo v. Bongiovanni.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: SAN FILIPPO V. BONGIOVANNI
A. Factual History
Joseph San Filippo was a tenured chemistry professor at
Rutgers University.'" The story of his stormy relationship with his
former employer is complicated, but quite typical of the unhappy
employment situations in which first amendment retaliatory dis-
charge claims typically arise. Professor San Filippo's problems with
the University began in 1977 when he wrote a letter to the chemistry
department chairman complaining about allegedly unsafe conditions
in the chemistry laboratory. 145 From 1977 to 1986, San Filippo was an
outspoken critic of university policies and practices, testifying before a
grand jury regarding an investigation into the manufacture of illegal
drugs in the chemistry laboratory, and reporting to the press that
undergraduate students at Rutgers were subjected to health hazards
in the chemistry labs.146 San Filippo also criticized the chemistry
department for misrepresenting funding needs and for other financial
irregularities. During this time administrators frequently berated
San Filippo for his "disloyalty.'
4 7
In 1981, the chemistry department declined to recommend San
Filippo for promotion to full professorship.48 San Filippo filed a
grievance with the University and eventually a lawsuit in state court,
claiming that he had been denied promotion through manipulation of
his employee file.149 In 1984, San Filippo fied another grievance and
requested and received an arbitration hearing after failing to receive
143. The court in Bradley did acknowledge that other courts had held that "a public em-
ployee's right to petition is to be evaluated in light of the contents of the petition." Id. at 1075.
144. San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 426.




149. Id. at 427-28.
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a merit salary increase. 150 In November 1985, he brought a state libel
action against three administrators who had accused him of falsifying
time reports relating to his technical assistants.151 Finally, in March
1986, San Filippo brought a lawsuit against Rutgers in state court,
protesting the University's decision to cut off without a hearing his
access to graduate student assistance for his research. 152
On October 1, 1986, the president of Rutgers brought formal
written charges against San Filippo, claiming that he had taken ad-
vantage of his position by exploiting his foreign student graduate
assistants.153 On May 13, 1988, after hearing and review, the
University Board of Governors directed that San Filippo be dismissed
from his post.54 In June 1988, San Filippo filed suit in federal court
under section 1983, claiming that the dismissal violated his speech,
petition, equal protection, and due process rights under the United
States Constitution. His first amendment claim was based on his
contention that he had been fired in retaliation for exercising his
rights to exercise free speech and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.' 55
B. The Holding
San Filippo v. Bongiovanni reached the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals for the second time 56 in August of 1994, on the issue of
whether summary judgment should be granted to defendants Rutgers
and its Board of Governors on Professor San Filippo's first
amendment claim. The district court had held that lawsuits and
grievances, like speech generally, are protected under the First
Amendment only if they address a matter of public concern. 67 The
150. Id. at 428.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 428-29.
153. Id. at 429. The charges included allegations that San Filippo had required Chinese
graduate assistants to perform domestic work for him, such as gardening and cleaning.
154. Id. at 430.
155. Id.
156. San Filippo advanced to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for the first time in 1992,
at which time the court held that the regulations upon which San Filippo's dismissal was based
were not void for vagueness, remanding the case for further proceedings. 961 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir.
1992).
157. 30 F.3d at 431. In so holding, the district court rejected the recommendation of the
magistrate judge who, upon remand from the Court of Appeals, had originally considered the
summary judgment motions filed by both sides on San Filippo's constitutional claims. In his
Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge suggested that summary judgment be
granted in defendant's favor on San Filippo's due process claims, but that summary judgment be
denied on San Filippo's first amendment claims. Id. at 430. The magistrate judge explained
that the Third Circuit used a three-part balancing test (described in notes 88-89 and
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district court found that while some of San Filippo's speech met this
threshold, the speech for which he was allegedly fired, including the
speech contained in his grievances and lawsuits against the
University, did not. The district court concluded that San Filippo's
first amendment claim was not entitled to further judicial scrutiny,
and granted summary judgment to Rutgers. 158
The Court of Appeals described the main question to be ad-
dressed in deciding the summary judgment issue as being whether
the activity in which San Filippo had engaged, and for which he was
allegedly fired, constituted protected activity under the First
Amendment.159 The court acknowledged the Connick public concern
requirement for first amendment protection of expressive conduct
constituting speech, but pointed out that San Filippo's expressive
conduct, including the filing of lawsuits and grievances, had not been
limited to speech, but had implicated the first amendment petition
right as well.1 0 The Court of Appeals seemed to agree with the dis-
trict court's conclusion that while some of San Filippo's speech had
been on matters of public concern, his petitioning activity had in-
volved purely private matters.'6 ' Thus, the questions of whether an
employee is protected under the Petition Clause against retaliation
for having filed a petition addressing solely a matter of private con-
cern162 and whether the Connick public concern test would bar such a
claim were before the court yet again. Although the Third Circuit had
avoided addressing such questions four years earlier in Bradley,'63
this time Judge Pollack, writing for the majority, expressed an
intention to face these issues squarely, despite the lack of guidance in
this area from the Supreme Court.
164
accompanying text) to assess a public employee's claim of retaliation for having engaged in a
protected activity. Id. With respect to the first prong of the test, the magistrate foreshadowed
the holding of the Court of Appeals in concluding that unlike speech generally, which is
protected under the First Amendment only if it addresses a matter of public concern, San
Filippo's lawsuits and grievances constituted activities protected under the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment, regardless of whether they addressed matters of public concern. Id. at
431. The magistrate found that a fact finder could reasonably infer that San Filippo's
petitioning activity was a substantial motivating factor in the dismissal, and therefore
recommended further discovery and denial of summaryjudgment. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 434.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 435.
162. Id.
163. 913 F.2d at 1064.
164. San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 435.
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The court began its attempt to define the scope of San Filippo's
petition right protection by examining the scope given to the petition
right by the Supreme Court in contexts other than the retaliatory
discharge of a public employee. The court traced the development of
the petition right as a source of immunity from the antitrust laws,
citing relevant passages from the familiar trio of Noerr, Pennington,
and Trucking Unlimited.16 5  The court then detailed the express
limitations that supreme court decisions had placed on the petition
right, discussing at length the unprotected status of "sham" judicial
petitions as described by the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson's
Restaurants.166 The court also described as a limitation the Supreme
Court's holdings in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees 167
and Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 68 that the
Petition Clause does not require the government to respond to every
communication that the communicator may denominate a petition.69
The Third Circuit discussed the anti-libel limitation on the political
petition considered by the Supreme Court in McDonald, citing the
"cut from the same cloth" and "inspired by the same ideals" passages
relied on by so many other lower federal courts in applying Connick to
petition clause claims.Y17 The San Filippo court, however, refused to
accept any of these cases, including McDonald, as dispositive
precedent in the area of retaliatory discharge of public employees.1' 1
Having come to the conclusion that there was no binding case
law on point, the court evaluated the merits of the arguments put
forth by both San Filippo and Rutgers in light of the fundamental
underlying purposes of the Petition Clause.'7 2 In determining these
purposes, the Third Circuit looked not only to the general principals
laid out in supreme court decisions, but also to the interests served by
the petition right in the retaliatory discharge context and to the
origins and history of the petition right. The court disagreed with San
Filippo's contention that the protection given the petition right should
be the same in every context in which it was exercised.173 San Filippo
165. Id. at 435-36.
166. Id. at 436-37.
167. 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
168. 465 U.S. 271 (1984).
169. San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 437.
170. Id. at 438 (citing McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482,485).
171. Id. Judge Pollack noted that "[als the arguments advanced in the briefs in the case at
bar make clear, the Supreme Court cases we have just canvassed, while long on nuance, do not
yield an easily identified single common dominator." Id.




had argued that the petitions at issue in Noerr and Pennington did
not address matters of public concern, and therefore that those cases
had implicitly rejected the proposition that petitioning is protected
under the First Amendment only if it involves a matter of public
concern. 174 The court instead agreed with Rutgers's contentions that
"the nature of the limitation upon the petition right depends on
context," and that analyzing the scope of the petition right in
antitrust cases was not necessarily instructive in determining the
scope of the right in a retaliatory discharge case.175 The court pointed
out that one strength of this argument lay in the fact that other first
amendment rights such as speech differ in scope depending on the
context in which they are exercised.1
6
The court, however, refused to go along with Rutgers in the
next step of its argument. It held that the conclusion that the scope of
the right to petition was dependent upon context did not mean that
the public concern threshold necessarily limited the petition right in
the context of a governmental employer seeking to discipline a public
employee. 177 The court rejected the underlying premise of Rutgers's
argument, the same premise upon which most other federal courts
had based their holdings in similar cases, that a petition clause claim
is never entitled to be treated differently than a speech clause claim
brought under similar circumstances.78 By reframing the main issue
in the case at bar as being whether there were contexts in which the
Petition Clause protected values additional to those protected by the
Speech Clause, the court recognized that a separate analysis might be
appropriate.
79
The court described McDonald as a case where the Petition
Clause protected no value that was not protected by the Speech
Clause. 80 The court reasoned that the words contained in the letter
to then-President Reagan were no different than words to the same
effect appearing in the New York Times, with the similarity strength-
ened by the fact that the president, like the paper, had no obligation











value, whatever format they appeared in, and thus were entitled to
the same limitations in both cases, for the same reasons.181 The court
acknowledged that a similar inextricable intermingling of speech and
petition clause interests could occur in the context of the alleged
retaliatory discharge or disciplining of a public employee, citing
Schalk v. Gallemore82 as an example of such a case. 83 As in
McDonald, the "petition" in Schalk was in the form of a letter that
imposed on its recipient no obligation to respond.84 Therefore, the
court concluded, the Tenth Circuit had properly held that the em-
ployee's right to petition in Schalk was inseparable from her right to
speak and accordingly analyzed the claim under Connick.
85
San Filippo, however, did not merely send a complaining let-
ter. His filing of lawsuits and grievances, the court wrote, constituted
invocations of formal mechanisms for the redress of grievances.186 The
court held that by establishing the grounds for a right of access to
courts claim through the invocation of such formal mechanisms, San
Filippo had presented the court with a petition interest distinct from
the speech interests implicated in his claim. The court acknowledged
its divergence from the reasoning of its sister circuits, particularly the
Seventh, which had explicitly rejected the proposition that the
Petition Clause protected access to the courts for any reason other
than for use as a forum for expression. 187
The court addressed but dismissed the primary argument put
forth by the other circuits, and by Judge Beckers's dissenting opinion
in San Filippo, in favor of applying Connick to petition clause claims:
that it would be somehow unjust to give special treatment to speech
in the form of a petition, or to plaintiffs who happen to present their
speech in the form of a grievance or lawsuit.188 There is no injustice,
the court held, because invocation of a mechanism for redress of
grievances involves interests of a constitutional dimension different
from and completely independent of speech interests.189 The court
then attempted to define these interests.
181. Id.
182. 906 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1990).




187. Id. at 439-41. See also Belk, 858 F.2d at 1261-62; Altman, 734 F.2d at 1240.
188. San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 441-42 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In his dissent in San Filippo Judge Becker had called the majority holding "an invitation to the
wary to formulate their speech on matters of private concern as a lawsuit or grievance in order
to avoid being disciplined." Id. at 449.
189. Id. at 441.
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The Petition Clause, the court held, imposes on the United
States an obligation to have at least some channel open for those who
seek redress for perceived grievances. 190  Although the court
acknowledged that the government does not have an obligation to
recognize every communication that might be characterized as a
"petition,"'191 it also recognized that disciplining citizens for
legitimately invoking the formal mechanisms adopted by the state for
redressing grievances would undermine the Constitution's vital
purposes.192 The court further distinguished the interest in a petition
claim from the interest in a speech claim, noting that when a public
employee files a petition he does not appeal over the government's
head to the general citizenry, as he does when he speaks to the press.
When the employee fies a petition, the court noted, he is addressing
government and asking it to remedy a problem it has caused or for
which it is responsible.'
93
The San Filippo court then went on to articulate what it con-
sidered to be a better argument, not cited by other circuits, for apply-
ing Connick to petition as well as speech claims. The nature of the
employee's interest might be different in the two cases, the court
wrote, but the interest of the governmental employer in promoting
efficient public services remains the same regardless of the type of
potentially disruptive activity involved. 94 The court recognized that
employee lawsuits and grievances could be divisive in much the same
way that employee speech could be. 95 But having raised this argu-
ment, the court quickly dismissed it, with the same reference to the
above mentioned reasons "of constitutional dimension" for treating
petitions differently from mere speech in certain situations. 96
Finally, the San Filippo court noted that the petition right had
an independent pedigree substantially more ancient than that of the
190. Id. at 442. This obligation is imposed on the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
191. Id. at 442 (citing Smith, 441 U.S. at 463, and Knight, 465 U.S. at 271).
192. Id. Examples of formal governmental adoption of a mechanism for redress of griev-
ances given by the court are entry into a collective bargaining agreement that provides for a
grievance procedure and waiver of sovereign immunity from suit in the courts of that sovereign.
Id. Judge Pollack wrote that if the public employer could discharge an employee for invoking
one of these mechanisms, "the Petition Clause... would, for public employees seeking to
vindicate their employee interests, be a trap for the unwary-and a dead letter." Id.
193. Id.





freedoms of speech and press. 197 Focusing on the historical origins of
the modern petition right in the Magna Carta and the 1689 British
Bill of Rights, the court concluded that there was no persuasive
reason that the petition right should mean less in modern times than
it meant in seventeenth century England.
198
IV. ANALYSIS
A A Petition Clause Claim Should Receive a Separate Analysis
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals commendably acknowl-
edged that San Filippo's petition claim was entitled to consideration
apart from his speech claim. The court's thoughtful analysis
represents a step in the right direction towards bringing the petition
right out from under the shadow of its more illustrious first
amendment counterparts. Recent commentators have agreed that
there are important reasons for prying the petition interest apart
from the admixture of first amendment claims brought by most liti-
gants in retaliatory discharge cases.199
The almost universal application of Connick to public employee
petition clause infringement claims prior to San Filippo is the result,
not of reasoned analyses, but of federal courts' uneasiness in the pres-
ence of these claims. This Recent Development has already detailed
the scarcity of authority available to assist modern courts in
determining the limitations that may appropriately be placed on the
exercise of the petition right.200 On the topic of individual, as opposed
to collective, petitioning, the body of applicable case law dwindles to
nearly nothing. This unfortunate situation explains the pervasive
influence of McDonald v. Smith in retaliatory discharge/petition
clause infringement cases. McDonald has absolutely nothing to do
197. Id. at 442-43 (citing McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482).
198. Id. at 443. The court wrote that the "[tihe petition clause was not intended to be a
dead letter or a graceful but redundant appendage of the clauses guaranteeing freedom of
speech and press." Id.
199. See Smith, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1196 (cited in note 3) ("Petitioning historically and
textually is a separable right from speech and press, and the interests served by petitioning go
to the very heart of the principle of popular sovereignty. For these reasons, petitioning must be
regarded as an extremely valuable right. Exceptions imposed on free speech and press must be
critically examined before being held applicable to petitioning). See also Spanbauer, 21
Hastings Const. L. Q. at 17 (cited in note 8) (contending that, contrary to the Supreme Court's
assertion in McDonald, "the right to petition was cut from a different cloth than were the rights
of speech, press, and assembly'.
200. See notes 32-81 and accompanying text.
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with employment law or the right of access to courts, but it
unambiguously proclaims itself to be a petition clause decision. The
"cut from the same cloth" dicta from McDonald provides an attractive
out for courts, keeping them from having to venture into largely
uncharted jurisprudential territory. By exercising the permission
supposedly granted to them by McDonald to treat all individual
petitioning as a mere sub-category of speech, these courts are relieved
not only of the task of determining the scope of petition clause
protection in various contexts, but even of the task of determining
whether the plaintiff has actually stated a petition clause claim at
all.201 The resulting body of case law is largely unhelpful to the
judges, scholars, and potential litigants seeking only to understand
what kinds of activities constitute first amendment petitioning in the
modern world.
That the "cut from the same cloth" approach merely represents
a judicial dodge is apparent from these same courts' treatment of
freedom of association claims.22 The association right is not a textual
guarantee, nor is it a free-standing right. It is ancillary by nature,
existing only as a means of preserving or enhancing the primary first
amendment liberties of assembly, worship, petition, and speech.203
Yet the same courts that brush aside the petition clause claims of
public employees have been willing to give careful consideration to
association claims arising in exactly the same kinds of situations.204
Several of these courts have declined to apply Connick on the grounds
that the association right protects an interest distinct from speech.205
The "cut from the same cloth" language is noticeably absent here.
The reason for the different treatment of these rights is simply that
the association right, unlike the petition right, has a separate identity
in the minds ofjurists. Unlike the petition right, the association right
is defined by a body of case law that lays out the purposes and scope
of the right and that allows judges to articulate with some confidence
what kinds of limitations may appropriately be placed on the right.206
201. See notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
202. See notes 105, 106 and accompanying text.
203. See Strauss, 61 Fordham L. Rev. at 477-78 (cited in note 106) (citing Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487
U.S. 1, 13 (1988)).
204. See notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
205. See note 106 and accompanying text.
206. See Strauss, 61 Fordhamn L. Rev. at 476-77, nn.22-29 (cited in note 106) (providing an
overview of caselaw and commentary pertaining to freedom of association).
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The most obvious reason that a petition clause claim is entitled
to an analysis separate from speech is the Constitution's text itself.
The Framers laid out the petition right alongside its first amendment
counterparts as a separate textual guarantee. If the Framers had
meant to include petitioning under the guarantee of free speech, they
could easily have done So. 20 7 The illustrious pre-constitutional history
of petitioning reinforces the argument that the right included in the
First Amendment was distinct in the Framers' conception from the
rights of assembly, worship, speech, and press. The important role
played by petitioning in the development of representative
government in England and America belies the contention that courts
are justified in treating the Petition Clause as a sort of second-tier
guarantee, or, as the court suggests in San Filippo, as a "dead
letter."208
One must be careful, however, not to overstate the history
argument, as some commentators have done in concluding that the
petition right is "superior" or "absolute."2°9 Certainly a historical
analysis aids in formulating a separate identity for the petition right
and in determining what kinds of activities fall into the category of
petitioning. The textual argument, however, cuts both ways. If the
Framers had intended to create a superior petitioning right they could
easily have done so. An unequivocal declaration of an absolute
petition right would undoubtedly create the impermissible hierarchy
of first amendment rights over which the federal courts fret.210 The
federal courts that have addressed petition claims, however, have
taken this concern to an extreme. The mistake that these courts
make lies in assuming that by even entertaining the possibility that a
petition claim might merit different treatment than a speech claim in
certain situations, the courts would violate McDonald's proscription
207. Actually, James Madison originally envisioned the Petition Clause as part of a
separate amendment. See note 28 and accompanying text. During the congressional debate on
the proposed amendment, Madison described the Petition Clause as ensuring that the people
would be able to "communicate their will" through direct petitions to the government. 1 Annals
of Cong. 738 (1789).
208. 30 F.3d at 442.
209. See Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 68 (cited in note 8) ("History reveals that
the right to petition evolved.., into a broad right which was distinct from and superior to the
rights of speech, press, and assembly.... Yet the Supreme Court has ignored these historical
facts... collaps[ing] the historically superior right to petition into the other historically inferior
rights of the First Amendment"); Smith, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1196 (cited in note 3) (stating that
where only private interests are affected, petitioning should be "absolutely privileged, save
where the conduct is merely a sham").
210. See Belk, 858 F.2d at 1261 (stating that if the court were to adopt the plaintiffs
position that the right to petition [was] absolute, "we would be guilty of implementing precisely
the sort of hierarchy of first amendment rights forbidden by McDonald").
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against elevating the petition right to "special First Amendment
status."211
This insistence on identical treatment of first amendment
rights as a necessary manifestation of the equal status of these rights
is nonsensical, and peculiar to the context of petition clause claims.
Again, the willingness of courts to exempt association claims from the
limits applied to speech claims in identical situations must be
noted.212 A court's likely reaction if asked to apply the Connick public
concern test to a public employee's claim that her employer had
retaliated against her for engaging in some type of religious activity
provides an even better example, setting aside the fact that Congress
has chosen to pull this particular first amendment guarantee from the
realm of expressive rights and recast it as something akin to an
immutable trait, like race or sex, unlawful per se as a criteria in
employment decisions.23 Even without the mandate of Title VII or a
similar statutory scheme, a court would likely reject the public
concern test at the outset as being an inappropriate criteria in this
kind of first amendment claim. Likewise, courts faced with legitimate
petition clause claims must at least venture to ask whether the
proposed limitation on the petition right is appropriate under the
circumstances of the case at hand, explaining why or why not.
B. The Connick Public Concern Test is Inapplicable to Petition Clause
Right of Access to Courts Claims
The court in San Filippo correctly framed the main issue to be
addressed in determining the appropriateness of the application of
the Connick public concern test to a public employee's petition clause
retaliatory discharge claim as being whether there are contexts in
which the Petition Clause protects values additional to those pro-
tected by the Speech Clause.24 This focus on the nature of the claim-
ant's interest in a case is key to the court's analysis, and rightly so.
For if the interest that the aggrieved employee seeks to protect by
asserting a petition clause claim is identical to the interest protected
211. 472 U.S. at 485.
212. See notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988 ed. & Supp. V) (stating that it shall be an unlawful
employment practice "to fail to refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin").
214. See note 179 and accompanying text.
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by her speech claim, identical treatment of the claims is both logical
and appropriate. Sometimes these interests are the same, as the San
Filippo court acknowledged in its approving reference to the Tenth
Circuit's handling of the letter-writing employee in Schalk.21 But this
is not always the case. Significantly, not all petitions are the same,
and the nature of the interest implicated in a petition clause claim
may be determined by the form of the petition itself. This Recent
Development subdivides modern petitions into two categories: the
political petition, and the judicial petition.
1. Political Petitions
The court in McDonald characterized the petition right as "an
assurance of a particular freedom of expression. 216 This provides an
adequate definition when a petitioner's only interest is in expressing
her views, criticisms, or complaints to a governmental entity that may
or may not respond to the petition but has no obligation to do so.
Examples of this kind of "political" petitioning include the lobbying
effdrts of the unions and commercial entities in the antitrust cases,
217
the letter to then-President Reagan in McDonald,2 8 the letter to the
hospital board in Schalk,2 9 and, arguably, the distribution of the
questionnaire in Connick.220 In these cases the petitioners simply
want to be heard, as they attempt to win influence or contribute to the
marketplace of ideas. It is easy to recognize, as the court did in San
Filippo, that the interests protected by speech and petition claims are
indistinguishable in such cases. Political petition claims, therefore,
may appropriately be subjected to the same type of content-based
limitations placed on speech claims brought under similar
circumstances, including the Connick public concern test.
221
215. See note 121 and accompanying text.
216. 472 U.S. at 482.
217. See notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
218. 472 U.S. at 480-81. See notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
219. 906 F.2d at 492-93. See note 121 and accompanying text.
220. 461 U.S. at 141. See notes 93, 107, 108 and accompanying text.
221. This conclusion goes against the contentions of those who say that petition claims
should never be subjected to the same limitations as speech claims. See note 209 and
accompanying text. As explained, this Recent Development rejects one foundation of this
argument, that the petition right is, by virtue of its ancient lineage, superior. In addition, the
historical reasons for giving political petitioners special protection no longer exist in modem
society. The petition right was once the only refuge for those wishing to address the
government with impunity. Protection for the criticism of the government and the expression of
unorthodox views is now found in the greatly expanded modern rights of free speech and press.
Protection against arbitrary punishment of petitioners is found in the modern readings of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
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2. Judicial Petitions: Different Treatment for Right of Access Claims
Sometimes the interests implicated in a petition claim go be-
yond mere expression. The act of petitioning itself, not merely the
expressive content of the petition, may warrant protection. This can
be seen in the case of 'Judicial" petitions addressed to governmental
tribunals. In the form of right of access to courts claims, the modern
petition right fully emerges from the shadow of free speech. Speech is
necessarily involved in framing a judicial petition, but this does not
mean that litigation merely represents another form of expression,
like publishing a letter or addressing passersby on a street corner.222
When a citizen petitions a court of law, she is not merely interested in
being heard; she is interested in obtaining real and immediate relief
for a perceived grievance. And unlike legislatures and school boards,
courts have an obligation to respond in some fashion to the petitions
they receive.223 It is clear that the petition clause right of access
claim, while admittedly often brought for the same purpose as a
speech impingement claim, is very different.
The separateness of the right of access claim from first
amendment expressive rights claims is further demonstrated by the
fact that a right of access to the courts has been found to emanate
from the Due Process Clause, as well as from the First Amendment,
in contexts completely divorced from questions of free expression.2 4
Because the petition clause right of access protects interests
unrelated to the expressive content of the petition, content-based
limitations on the right, such as the Connick public concern test, are
inappropriate. Of course, this does not mean that the right of access
to courts is absolute. Limitations more in line with those placed on
litigation generally, such as the sham exception articulated in Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, may appropriately bar judicial scrutiny of
public employee retaliatory discharge claims.
225
222. Even if the speech contained in the judicial petition were the only issue, speech taking
place within the context of a courtroom proceeding has always been afforded special protection.
For instance, a majority of American courts confer absolute immunity from libel laws upon
individuals for statements made and evidence submitted in the course of judicial proceedings.
Spanbauer, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 54 (cited in note 8).
223. See notes 101, 190-193 for comments on the importance of the government's obligation
to respond to judicial petitions.
224. See McCoy, 598 F. Supp. at 315 (citingBounds, 430 U.S. at 821); Graham, 804 F.2d. at
959.
225. The sham exception, described in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 741, as the
witholding of petition clause protection from baseless lawsuits filed merely for purposes of
harassment, appears to be similar to another widely accepted limitation on an individual's right
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Under the above analysis, an important initial determination a
court must make is whether a petition is appropriately classified as
political or judicial. Lawsuits filed in state and federal court are
obviously judicial petitions. The initiation of judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings before administrative tribunals passes muster as well,
according to the Supreme Court in Trucking Unlimited.226
The San Filippo court included the filing of employee griev-
ances in this category, making clear its intent to use the term
"lawsuit" to refer to both Professor San Filippo's grievances and his
state law claims.2 7 This rather thoughtless lumping together of em-
ployee grievance procedures and bona fide lawsuits, typical of petition
clause analyses in other circuits, is inconsistent with the Third
Circuit's earlier decision in Bradley,228 where the court gave careful
consideration to the question of what kind of activity might qualify for
protection under the Petition Clause. The San Filippo court's
characterization of a collective bargaining agreement between a
governmental employer and a public employees' union as a "formal
government adoption of a mechanism for redress of grievances,' 229
similar to a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit in the courts of
the sovereign, is unsatisfactory. In the latter case, the government,
acting in its capacity as sovereign, has opened a channel for all
citizens, including public employees, to obtain redress for injuries
allegedly visited upon them by the government. In the former case, a
governmental entity acting in the capacity of employer, and likely
motivated by the desire to improve labor-management relations, has
agreed to adopt procedures that allow employees to challenge its
decisions as an employer. The invocation of these "in-house"
grievance procedures should not implicate the Petition Clause any
more than the invocation of similar procedures by an employee in the
private sector.230 To so hold would violate the spirit of Connick, which
acknowledges the differences between the roles of the government as
of access to a court, the malicious prosecution cause of action in tort. Black's Law Dictionary
defines a malicious prosecution as "[o]ne begun in malice without probable cause to believe that
charges can be sustained." Black's Law Dictionary at 958 (cited in note 2).
226. 404 U.S. at 510.
227. 30 F.3d at 439 n.18.
228. 913 F.2d at 1064. See notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
229. 30 F.3d at 442.
230. Some scholars agree that the filing of a union grievance does not constitute protected
first amendment petitioning activity. See Strauss, 61 Fordham L. Rev. at 486 (cited in note 106)
(citing United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 220-23, to support the contention that "[w]hen the
Supreme Court speaks of the ... right to petition.. ., it is referring to the right to appeal to the




sovereign and employer, and warns against the "constitutionalizing"
of private grievances.231 Thus, retaliatory discharge claims hinging on
the filing of employee grievances should be thrown out from under the
protective umbrella of the petition clause right of access to courts, and
into the realm of mere speech, subject to the public concern
threshold. 
2
C. The Pickering/Connick Balancing Test May be Applied to Petition
Clause Claims
If one accepts the proposition that a petition clause right of
access claim protects a different interest than is present in a speech
claim, it is easy to dismiss the "special treatment" arguments ad-
vanced by some circuit courts and by the dissent in San Filippo. But
the second argument considered by the court in San Filippo cannot be
so easily brushed aside. For even though the interest of the employee
is different in a petition clause right of access claim than in a speech
claim, the interest of the governmental employer, and of the
taxpaying public, in workplace harmony and efficiency remains the
same. The court in San Filippo admitted that employee lawsuits
could occasionally be as divisive as employee speech.233 In reality, a
lawsuit, carrying with it the obligation of the employer to respond, not
to mention the potential of attracting as much, if not more attention
than mere employee speech, is likely to be more divisive.2
14
As noted above, the court in San Filippo ended its analysis by
concluding that the Connick public concern test should not apply to
right of access claims. Nevertheless, in holding that a public em-
ployee's filing of a non-sham petition was not a constitutionally per-
missible ground for discharge, the court seems to be taking the same
approach as the court in McCoy. In that case, the court threw out the
entire Pickering/ Connick interest-balancing framework, holding that
231. 461 U.S. at 138, 154. There is arguably an association interest involved when the
grievance procedure involved is the result of collective bargaining. Whether or not Connick
should apply to association claims is a question that has been touched on in this Recent
Development. But the answer lies beyond the scope of this discussion.
232. Of course, in practice, adherence to this view would lead to the same result, dismissal
of the claim, that most federal courts have reached in their consideration of Petition Clause
retaliatory discharge claims. Most petition clause retaliatory discharge claims involve in-house
grievance procedures, not bona fide lawsuits. See the descriptions of petition clause cases in
notes 110-130 and accompanying text.
233. 30 F.3d. at 441.
234. This view is reflected in the dissent in San Filippo. Id. at 450 (Becker, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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the factors considered under the Connick analysis were not
transferable to a right of access to courts analysis.25 The court in
McCoy rejected the defendant employer's contention that the court
should balance the employee's right of access interest against the
interest of the municipal employer in settling wage disputes. This
approach inappropriately elevates the petition right of access to the
status of a superior right. The argument that the petition right of
access to courts differs from the speech right, and that it may not
appropriately be subjected to a content-based limitation, does not lead
to the conclusion that the right is overriding in all cases or immune
from being balanced against other legitimate interests.
The correct approach for courts to take when faced with a
retaliation claim brought by a public employee who has filed a lawsuit
against her employer would be first to recognize the claim, whether
the lawsuit involves a matter of public or private concern, and, sec-
ond, to apply the Pickering/Connick four-part test as it would in a
speech impingement claim. An interesting question is whether, at the
interest-balancing stage of the test, the right of access claim would or
should carry more weight than a mere speech claim. Even if it does,
this effect would likely be countered in many cases by the similarly
augmented interests of the employer faced with the potentially dis-
ruptive effects of ongoing litigation. Ironically, in the final analysis,
the liability of the employer might hinge on the nature of the lawsuit.
For example, a suit relating to a matter of public concern would likely
be given greater weight in a court's analysis than a suit involving a
purely private dispute. The fact that many retaliation claims result-
ing from private concern litigation will ultimately fail the
Pickering/Connick balancing test does not render the different treat-
ment given to the right of access claims at the initial stage of the test
meaningless. The important thing is that "private concern" right of
access claims will not be a barred at the door. They will be subjected
to judicial scrutiny, and, in a few cases, where the disruptive impact
on the workplace is low, the employee will prevail.236
235. McCoy, 598 F. Supp. at 315 n.4.
236. The workers' compensation claim in Bradley might be a good example of such a case.




Whether or not other circuits ultimately accept the court's
holding in San Filippo v. Bongiovanni,237 the thoughtful and detailed
analysis presented by the Third Circuit should at least force other
courts to articulate a genuine rationale for the imposition of the public
concern criteria to petition clause retaliatory discharge claims.
Hopefully, the debate that might be sparked by San Filippo will
provide some badly needed illumination in the murky world of
petition clause jurisprudence. This Recent Development has provided
some suggestions regarding the scope of the petition right in a very
particular context. The main purpose of the analysis presented here,
however, has been simply to increase awareness and understanding of
the petition right. This ancient right deserves more than the second-
class status to which it has been relegated by our judicial system.
The Petition Clause has a role to play in the modern world. It is up to
the courts to define that role and to ensure the vitality of the Petition
Clause as the vital and distinct source of rights it was meant to be.
Kara Elizabeth Shea*
237. So far, only the Seventh Circuit has explicitly rejected San Filippo, adhering to its
long-held view that "personal concerns do not become a matter of public concern because
pursued in a court of law." See O'Callaghan v. City of Chicago, 1995 W.L. 340882 *2 n.3 (N.D.
IM. 1995) (citing Zorzi v. County of Putnam, 30 F.3d 885, 896 (7th Cir. 1994)). Meanwhile, the
Third Circuit has reaffinmed its intention to subject petition clause right of access to court
claims raised in retaliatory discharge cases to an analysis distinct from that applied to speech
claims. Bieregu v. Reno, 1995 W.L. 409147 *6 (3d Cir. 1995).
* I would like to thank my parents, Neil and Karen Shea, and my husband, Jeff
Kirkwood, for their patience and loving support.
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